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Abstract
In this paper, we use a dynamic structural model to measure the effects of (i) single
mothers’ work and welfare use decisions and (ii) welfare reform initiatives on the
early cognitive development of the children of the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1979 mothers. We use standardized PIAT math test scores as a measure of
attainment. We find that both work and welfare use by mothers’ before children turn
six have positive impacts on children’s cognitive development.However, these bene-
fits decline as children’s observed innate ability increases and vary by the mother’s
attitudes towards welfare receipt and work, and by her child-rearing technology. In
the case of welfare use, for example, the effect can be negative if the mother has a
favorable view of welfare use or less welfare stigma, indicated by continuous welfare
utilization. We find that a policy change similar to the welfare time limit and work
requirement introduced by the welfare reform reduces use of welfare and increases
employment significantly. This policy change, however, only slightly increases test
scores. We also look at the implications of an exemption from welfare tax on labor
income and a maternal leave policy on children’s outcomes.
Keywords: Welfare reform, childhood cognitive development, female work, dynamic
choice model, maximum likelihood
JEL codes: I38, J22, J18
1 Introduction
In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
ended Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), replacing it with the new Tem-
porary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. PRWORA was the culmination
of many earlier changes to welfare policy in several states aimed at increasing employ-
ment among welfare recipients and reducing dependence on welfare programs. The TANF
program nationalized these changes and ended the entitlement period of welfare by intro-
ducing work requirements and a 5-year time limit on welfare benefits. In this paper, we
use a dynamic structural model to analyze the impact of welfare reform on the early cog-
nitive development of the children of those who choose to take welfare assistance. Using
a sample of low-skilled single mothers and their children from the NLSY79 data, we
first estimate the effects of mothers’ work and welfare use on children’s cognitive devel-
opment. We can then simulate the time limit and work requirement policies introduced
by PRWORA. With the simulated data we evaluate how these policy changes impact the
work and welfare participation behaviors of mothers and, as a result, children’s early cog-
nitive development. We also analyze possible effects on early cognitive development of
an exemption of welfare tax on labor income and a maternity leave policy.
Early cognitive development has been found to be a strong predictor of long-term
achievement and other outcomes. In particular, early test scores are strongly correlated
with educational attainment, crime involvement, salaries and out-of-wedlock pregnancy
(see reviews by Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 1997; Haveman and Wolfe, 1995; and Currie
and Thomas, 1995). Therefore, it is crucial to understand whether welfare policies affect
children’s early cognitive outcomes. Additionally, because parental time and financial
resources are likely to be the most important components of early nurturing, any public
policy that affects parents’ incentives to work or participate in welfare, and change the
opportunity costs of these inputs, should be carefully evaluated.
This paper adds to two strands of literature: (i) behavioral responses to welfare reform
and (ii) determinants of children’s early cognitive development. Despite an abundance of
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studies on the effects of welfare reform on mothers’ behaviors, proper attention has not
been given to the possible impacts that such behavior and welfare reform may have on
children. Except for a very recent paper by Miller and Zhang (2009), to our knowledge,
there is no other study that directly looks at the effects of welfare reform on children’s
outcomes. Miller and Zhang (2009) analyze the effects of welfare reform on the math
test scores of fourth and eighth graders in a difference-in-difference framework. Using
high-income children as controls, they find that welfare reform has no negative impact
on children’s long-term math ability outcomes. In fact, they show that welfare reform
narrow the gap in the scores of high-income and low-income children. In two related
papers, Bernal and Keane 2010 and 2011 use the variation in welfare rules generated by
the welfare reform and by earlier state-level waivers to identify the effects of child care on
children’s cognitive outcomes. Even though they did not directly study welfare reform, in
light of their estimates for marginal effects for child care use, these papers imply negative
effects of welfare reform on children’s cognitive development.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to perform a structural analysis of this
subject. This analysis allows us to model multiple mechanisms that affect the monetary
and other inputs of welfare participants. It further allows us to perform policy simulations
to capture the extent to which each individual component of welfare reform contributes
to changes in children’s outcomes. Moreover, we look at the effects of welfare reform on
early cognitive development outcomes, taken before the start of children’s formal school-
ing. Our findings complement Miller and Zhang’s in that we find a positive association
between children’s cognitive development and mothers’ employment and welfare use.
We contribute to the literature on the determinants of children’s achievement in three
ways. First, the effects of a mother’s decisions in our attainment-production function are
allowed to interact with the child’s (observed) innate ability, which is determined by a set
of time-invariant factors of the child. This setup allows us to obtain distributions for the
effects of work and welfare by children’s innate ability, in addition to a single coefficient
that measures only the effects at the mean level. To our knowledge, our model is one of
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only a few that allows for this flexibility. Bernal (2008) and Bernal and Keane(2010 and
2011)discuss the importance of allowing the marginal effects of a mother’s decisions to
vary with the child’s (observed) innate ability. These papers study the effects of moth-
ers’ child care use and work decisions on their children’s test scores. They find that the
marginal effects of a mother’s choices decrease with the increase in the innate ability of
the child. That is, although the effects on a child with the mean innate ability may be small
and positive, there are significantly larger positive impacts for children at the low end of
the innate ability distribution and large negative effects for those at the high end. We
follow a similar setup to construct our attainment-production function. Our second con-
tribution to the literature lies in our modeling strategy. Our model, motivated by Bernal
(2008)1, assumes that a child’s attainment, observed at the end of age five, is determined
by the cumulative welfare use and work experiences of the first five years after birth.
Using data from multiple periods enables us to identify the effects using a much richer
variation in mothers’ decisions. Moreover, it allows us to investigate the implication of
different “intensity”levels of work and welfare use.
Our third contribution is that through our modeling strategy, we are able to better
disentangle the various effects from factors that are proxied by mothers’ decisions. Fol-
lowing Chyi and Ozturk(2012), we model multiple channels through which a mother’s
decisions can affect a child’s attainment: direct monetary benefits, parental time invested
in the child and nonpecuniary benefits from in-kind transfer programs. Furthermore, we
also allow the mother’s attitude towards welfare program participation to be correlated
with her child rearing technology, which helps us to explain why, in the data, mothers
who use more welfare tend to have children with worse outcomes than children born to
otherwise similar mothers. The estimates hence provide a deeper understanding of the
workings of both AFDC and TANF.
Most studies on the relationship between welfare participation and early cognitive
achievement focus either on the determinants of children’s attainment or on the conse-
1Bernal and Keane(2010 and 2011)also use this model
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quences of growing up in poor families. In both areas, researchers use samples that are
restricted to children available in survey data sets and tend to employ an ordinary least
squares (OLS) method for estimation. They generally find significantly negative relation-
ships between welfare receipt and various types of child attainment measures. As has
been pointed out before (see Currie, 1998; Duncan, Magnuson and Ludwig, 2004; and
Dahl and Lochner, 2005), these negative relationships do not necessarily indicate causal
connections, mostly because of improper comparison groups or the unobserved hetero-
geneity issue.
In this paper, we use the variation in AFDC cash benefits across U.S. states as well as
county-level information to alleviate the concern of unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover,
to avoid improper group comparison, we focus only on the attainment of children born to
single mothers with twelve or fewer years of schooling. Such mothers are most likely to
satisfy the financial eligibility requirement for welfare programs.2 As a result, rather than
making comparisons with children from economically stable, two-parent families that do
not qualify for welfare, we measure the effects of welfare by ascertaining the difference
in attainment between welfare recipients and eligible nonparticipants.
Our estimates suggest that mothers have an incentive to invest more in children with
lower innate ability. Furthermore, single mothers’ employment in the first five years of
their children’s lives has positive effects on children’s cognitive development, but these
benefits decline with an increase in the children’s innate ability. The marginal effect
of an additional year of employment on a child with median ability is an increase of
about 0.426 percent of his or her test score.3 To analyze the effect of mothers’ welfare
use on children’s attainment, we allow heterogeneity in terms of taste for welfare use
and child rearing technology. Our estimates suggests two types of mothers: Mothers
with low taste for welfare use and good child rearing technology, and mothers with high
taste for welfare and bad technology. For a mother, who prefers less welfare use and
2We can theoretically define our sample using the exact financial eligibility of welfare based on each
individual’s information. However, a sample based on financial eligibility creates a potential selection
problem because earnings is an outcome of the endogenous work decision.
3The PIAT Math test score has a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15.
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has good rearing technology, the net marginal effect of an additional year of welfare is
positive. For a child with median ability, this welfare participation benefit is 2.2% per
year. While for a median ability child with a mother who has low welfare stigma and bad
technology to rear her child, this effect is 0.417 percent per year. The marginal effect of
welfare use by this type of mother can become even negative if the child is endowed with
higher than median innate ability. It is worth noting that our positive employment effects
are significantly different from previous literature which documents negative cognitive
achievement responses to the employment of mothers from two-parent, less economically
vulnerable families. We take this as evidence that for children who grew up in families
headed by low-skilled single mothers, the benefits of mothers’ employment outweigh the
detrimental effects.
We find that for a child who has the median level of observed innate ability, policies
that reduce welfare use and/or increase employment are beneficial to that child’s early
cognitive achievement. Specifically, our counterfactual policy simulations suggest that a
policy that combines a work requirement and a two-year welfare time limit that is similar
to the current welfare reform initiatives reduces a single mother’s use of welfare and
increases the incidence of employment. Our result shows that this combination of both
initiatives significantly increases the child’s test score by about 1.8 percent. Following an
initiative that is adopted by many state waiver programs, we also simulate an exemption
in the welfare tax on labor income. The simulated policy practice sharply increases work
decisions without changing welfare participation patterns. Consequently, the simulated
test score for a median child increases by only about 0.42 percent.
In addition to these counterfactual analysis that mimics the welfare reform, we simu-
late several new policy changes that have not been implemented but may be of interest to
policy makers including a maternity leave policy and welfare tax relief on labor income.
A maternity leave policy reduces employment by 9 percentage points but increases wel-
fare participation by about 6 percentage points. This policy eventually decreases log test
scores by about 0.68 percent on average. By eliminating welfare tax on labor income we
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can increase work in this population by about 6 to 12 percentage points: a very significant
change in work behavior. This will result in 0.46 percent increase in the log mean test
score.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section proposes an economic model
of a child’s attainment production. Section 2.2 discusses the econometric estimation of
this model and the identification of parameters. Section 3 describes the data used in the
analysis, while Sections 4 and 5 report the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Our model is closely related to that of Bernal (2008), in which mothers are the sole de-
cision makers of the family. We model a mother’s annual welfare and work participation
decisions for the first five years following her child’s birth.4 In each period, her utility
is comprised by her consumption of leisure, a composite good and her child’s current
level of potential attainment. She observes her child’s innate ability and produces the
child’s current attainment by contributing monetary and non-monetary resources through
her work and welfare use decisions. At the age of the first PIAT-Math test, we observe
a test score that proxies the cognitive attainment as a function of observed innate ability,
cumulative welfare use, employment history and income. This is traditionally how hu-
man capital formulation is devised as proposed by Ben-Porath (1967), where cumulative
investment determines human capital.
A mother is assumed to know the level of innate ability a child is born with. Econo-
metricians, however, can only infer the level by time-invariant variables observed at the
time of child’s birth. The so-called observed innate ability (A0) is determined by two
things. The first is the child’s own characteristics, including birth weight and dummy
variables indicating race (Black=1) and gender (girl=1).5 The second is inherited abil-
4In fact, in the model we also make use of the information of her decisions from two years prior to her
child’s birth, but these decisions are treated as given.
5Race and gender are included in the innate ability function purely for simplicity. We expect girls and
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ity as determined by mother’s accumulated human capital, proxied by her Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT) percentile score, number of years of education, age at birth
and years of work and welfare participation prior to giving birth.6 It can be written as:
lnA0 = γ6birth weight+ γ7gender + γ8race+ γ9ageless18 + γ10agemore33
+ γ11edu+ γ12AFQT + γ13prior welfare+ γ14prior work.
(1)
Both prior work and welfare variables are dummy variables indicating whether a mother
has welfare use and work experiences in the two years prior to her child’s birth. The effect
of a mother’s age at childbirth on innate cognitive ability is characterized by two dummy
variables that equal to 1 either when a mother is younger than 18 (ageless18) or when she
is older than 33 (agemore33). These indicators capture the increased possibility of health
problems for children born to young mothers and complications for geriatric pregnancy
that may lead to lower cognitive scores.7
A mother produces her child’s current cognitive achievement by investing money
(from labor and welfare incomes) and non-monetary resources. For example, mothers
spend time taking care of their children and also provide their children a role model in
their daily lives. As our population consists of low-income children, their mothers can
also choose to participate in Medicaid or take up free child care through the welfare pro-
gram. However, these non-monetary inputs are not directly observed in the data. We
use work and welfare use decisions as proxy variables to capture their effects. Later, we
boys to be affected by maternal inputs in different ways. Moreover, we expect cultural differences with
respect to family structure, child care choice and breastfeeding behavior across races. These factors are
shown to be important contributors to cognitive development. By incorporating these fixed factors into the
innate ability function, we reduce the number of parameters to be estimated significantly while capturing
potential differences between different racial backgrounds and genders.
6This strategy to capture the children’s unobserved ability endowment is also used in Bernal (2008)
and Bernal and Keane (2010 and 2011). These variables merely reflect correlations rather than causal
relationships.
7We try including a variable measuring a mother’s age at birth together with age dummies. However,
the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. We suspect that the effect may have been absorbed
by other maternal characteristics such as years of education or the age dummy itself. Thus, we do not use
this variable in lnA0.
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discuss specific channels through which mothers’ work and welfare use decisions affect
children’s attainments. The log of a child’s attainment (At) is
lnAt = lnA0 + γ1 ln
Yt
Nt
+ γ2Et + γ3Wt + γ4 lnA0Wt + γ5 lnA0Et,
8 (2)
where Yt is income accumulated thus far since childbirth. As we do not model a mother’s
childbearing decision, we calculate the average income spent on each child by dividing
Yt by the number of children (N ) at year t.9 Yt =
∑t
s=1
(
hsY
L
s + ωsBs + Y
O
s
)
represents
available financial resources, which is the sum of labor earnings (Y L > 0 if working),
welfare benefits (B > 0 if on welfare) and other income (Y O).10
Et and Wt are the cumulative work and welfare use t years after the child’s birth,
respectively.11 Et =
∑t
s=1 hs where hs=0, 1, or 2 if the mother is not employed, employed
part-time or full-time in year s, respectively. Similarly, Wt =
∑t
s=1 ωt, where ωs=0 if the
mother is not on welfare at year s, 1 otherwise.
By adding interactions between the mothers’ decisions and the observed innate ability,
we allow for possible differential effects of the mothers’ decisions by observed innate
ability. In other words, a child’s innate ability can affect the returns for the mother’s
various inputs in the production of current cognitive ability. To simplify the matter, we
8A small but interesting point is whether we should include a constant term in lnA0. Since we include
the main effects of work and welfare, γ2 and γ3 in lnAt, respectively, adding a constant term in lnA0 will
not provide further economic information on a mother’s child rearing technology.
9Although the average observed number of children in our sample is 2.4, modeling childbearing deci-
sions is outside the scope of this paper. As a result, we treat the number of children as given, and treat
children born to the same mother as independent observations. Bernal (2008) and Bernal and Keane (2010
and 2011) use a similar treatment.
10Note that cumulative income itself is a function of mothers’ decisions. Initially, income is allowed to
interact with lnA0 to capture the potential effects of income on children with the observed innate ability.
Since the estimated coefficient of a such model is not significant, we drop this interaction term for simplicity.
11We assume that only the cumulative years matter. Bernal (2008) and Bernal and Keane (2010 and
2011) have a similar setup. A different modeling strategy is based on the timing of investment (see for
example, Brooks-Gunn, Han and Waldfogel, 2002 and an excellent review by Todd and Wolpin, 2003).
In such a model, inputs made by the mother at the child’s different ages may have different effects on the
child’s potential achievement. The empirical results of a such model using our sample (not presented but
available upon request) show that none of the coefficients is significant.
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assume the child’s cognitive ability is known to the mother at any point in time (but not
observed by the econometrician). We can only observe the outcomes of a test the child
is given as a part of a survey, from which ability is inferred. This outcome function will
be discussed in detail in Section 2.2.3. The outcome measures we adopt come from the
Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1979 cohort (Children of
NLSY79). The standardized Peabody Individual Achievement Tests (PIAT) are given to
the Children of NLSY79 sample from age five onwards. We use the mathematics (PIAT-
Math) test scores as the outcome measure primarily because they have been shown to be
predictors of not only later math scores but also other academic achievement (for example
see Claessens, Duncan and Engel, 2009 and Duncan et al., 2007).12
As mentioned before, a mother’s work and welfare use experiences during her child’s
childhood serve as proxy variables for non-monetary inputs that cannot be measured di-
rectly. After laying down the attainment production function, it is useful to discuss the
channels through which a mother’s welfare and work decisions affect her child’s attain-
ment, and what is captured by the coefficients of WT , ET , and Y in Equation (2). Welfare
can affect the attainment of a child in three ways: (i) income, (ii) time spent with the
child and (iii) non-cash benefits through related programs. First, any income effects are
captured by the coefficient of Yt
Nt
. Second, a mother may choose to substitute welfare for
work so that she can invest more time in her child’s nurturing. This effect will be cap-
tured by a decrease in maternal employment, Et. Thus, the welfare coefficient captures
only the contributions of the nonpecuniary benefits of being on welfare. Many means-
tested transfer programs are linked with AFDC (and now with TANF), such as the early
childhood education program, Head Start, housing subsidies and the Medicaid health in-
surance program. As we do not separately control for participation in different programs
that are linked with AFDC (according to Currie (1998), it is almost impossible to do so),
the benefits on a child’s attainment from these programs are captured by the coefficient of
12To increase the sample size, Bernal (2008) and Bernal and Keane (2010 and 2011) incorporate the PIAT-
Math, PIAT-Reading and Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) scores to form an outcome measure. In
other words, in these papers each individual child can potentially be counted in the estimation up to three
times.
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the welfare use history, Wt.
Additionally, mothers’ employment decisions can affect ability through (i) income,
(ii) time spent with the child and (iii) other work-related activities that may affect chil-
dren’s outcomes. The first effect is captured by the coefficient of average income. The
second and third effects are captured by the coefficient of ET . We can think of two
possible consequences of this effect. On the one hand, work picks up the effects of
the unobserved lost time for a mother to educate or care for her child and may thus be
detrimental to a child’s attainment. Morrill (2009) shows that a mother’s employment
increases the probability of poor health outcomes for 7- to 17-year-olds, which is prob-
ably true for younger children as well. In fact, although indirectly through child care
and as a function of supervision, Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) and Curie and Hotz
(2004) show that increases in mothers’ employment heighten the probability of injuries
and poor health outcomes in kindergarten-aged children, which may in turn affect their
cognitive development (see, for example, Blau and Grossberg, 1992). On the other hand,
children’s attainment can improve when, for instance, working mothers provide a positive
role model for them to follow. Both the sociology and psychology literature commonly
argue the role model effect to be strong. Also, according to Cascio (2009), low-income
mothers are more likely than married women to put their children in kindergarten, per-
haps because kindergarten is, among other things, 100 percent subsidized day care. If
working mothers’ children, who are placed in kindergarten, have access to educational
tools in the classroom that are not available in the home environment, as is very likely the
case for disadvantaged families, we may observe a positive relationship between a child’s
attainment and the mother’s employment. Our outcome measures take place before chil-
dren go to elementary school. As a result, low-skilled mothers’ employment can capture
the benefits obtained from subsidized child care.13 Unless we are willing to make more
structural assumptions on how a mother takes care of her child, the two opposite effects
13However, as Cascio and Schanzenbach (2007) and Bedard and Dhuey (2006) point out, this could lower
the school entry age for disadvantaged children, which might be detrimental because younger children tend
to perform worse than older children in most school cohorts. This may suggest that the short-run benefit
may not last long.
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will be both captured by the coefficient of ET in Equation (2). It becomes an empirical
question as to which effect dominates.
2.1 Mother’s Optimization Problem
In each period (year), a mother makes two decisions: whether to participate in welfare
(IW ) and how much to work (h). Welfare choice is defined as a binary variable, and work
choice is set as able to have three possibilities: working full-time (at least 1,500 hours a
year, that is, at least 30 hours a week for 50 weeks), working part-time (between 500 hours
(at least 10 hours a week for 50 weeks) and 1499 hours per year), and not working (less
than 500 hours per year). As a result, in each year, a mother chooses from six alternatives,
which can be formally written as J = {(ht, Iwt ) : ht = 0, 1, 2; Iwt = 0, 1}. We use an
indicator function, dj , to represent the alternatives that are chosen, where j = 1, .., 6. To
clarify, j = 1 corresponds to (ht, Iwt ) = (0, 0), meaning that a mother chooses (no work,
no welfare) in period t; j = 2 represents (ht, Iwt ) = (1, 0) (part-time, no welfare); j = 3
represents (ht, Iwt ) = (2, 0) (full-time, no welfare), and so forth. dj = 1 indicates that
alternative j is chosen. With this setup, we estimate the joint probability distribution of
the mother’s work and welfare participation decisions.
In each period, the state vector St includes work experienceEt and cumulative welfare
usage Wt up to the current year. As we also make use of the information of a mother’s
work and welfare use decisions for the two years prior to her child’s birth, the state vector
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evolves in the following manner:14
E1 =h−1 + h−2
Et =Et−1 + ht−1
W1 =I−1 + I−2
Wt =Wt−1 + IWt−1,
(3)
where ht−1 and IWt−1 are the work and welfare choices in the previous periods, respectively.
Facing a given state vector Sτ at the beginning of a specific period τ , a mother makes
choices for periods from τ on (i.e., she chooses djt for t = τ, τ +1, ..., 5) to maximize her
expected utility of the remaining periods, which we call Vτ . Vτ is the (maximized) sum
of a mother’s current-period utility and discounted future utility, both of which depend on
which alternative of j she chooses for the current period that also maximizes Vτ .
Defining a current-period, alternative-specific utility, u(St, j, jt), as the sum of a de-
terministic part U jt and an alternative-specific shock jt , we have:
u(St, j, jt) = u(St, j) + djtjt = U
j
t + djtjt,
where jt is assumed to be i.i.d. across time. With St, j and discount rate β, we can write
Vt as
Vt ≡ V (St, jt) = max
djt
{V j(St, j) + djtjt},
where V j(St, j) is given by the recursive form
V j(St, j) = U
j
t + β
∑
S′
Pr(S ′ | S, j)EV (S ′, ′).15
14Notice that initial conditions E1 and W1 are predetermined because they depends only on information
before a child’s birth, which is taken as given.
15Note that in our setup of transition of state variables, Equation (3), Pr(S′ | S, j) is deterministic.
12
The solution method for the mother’s optimization problem is a standard backward
induction. To refer to it, see Appendix A.1.
2.2 Empirical Implementation
This section lists our empirical specifications and discusses their economic implications.
We structurally estimate the parameters of these functions.
2.2.1 Mother’s Current Period Utility Function
The mother’s current-period utility of choosing alternative j ∈ J is given by
U(St, j, jt) =
1
α1
cα1jt + α2ht + α3(
Aλt − 1
λ
) + α4I
W
t + α5I(Wt = 0)
+ α6I(Et = 0) + α7I
h
1 + jt,
(4)
where ct is composite consumption, ht is the mother’s current work decision, At is the
child’s current-period potential cognitive attainment. Iht and I
w
t are the indicators for
work and welfare participation in period t. Wt and Et are accumulated work and welfare
experience from the two periods before giving birth until the beginning of the current
period.
We normalize the utility unit of the composite consumption to one. As a result, utili-
ties of the remainders in the function are measured relative to the value of the composite
consumption good. Parameters α2 and α4 are distastes for work and welfare, respec-
tively.16 The mother cares about her child’s attainment as it increases her current period
utility. This is captured by α3, which should be a positive number. Parameter α5 captures
the additional disutility incurred when applying for welfare for the first time,17 and α6
16It is worth mentioning here that we allow the taste of welfare use (α4) to vary according to the type of
mothers. See further discussion in Section 2.2.4.
17This assumption is consistent with the concept of welfare stigma pioneered by Moffitt (1983).
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is the cost of initiating work if one has never worked before. α7 is added to capture the
extra cost if a mother chooses to work during the first year after giving birth (t = 1).18
The utility function is constant relative risk averse (CRRA) both in terms of consumption
and child’s cognitive achievement. For example, by CRRA, λ < 1 means that the mother
receives diminishing returns to the child’s achievement and thus has a higher incentive to
compensate her child with lower innate ability.
The composite consumption good is determined by the current-period income ob-
tained through the budget constraint
cjt = wtht +BjtI
W
t +Mt,
in which wt is the offered wage, Bjt is the dollar amount of welfare transfer for that
year and Mt is the non-labor and non-welfare income. As our population focuses on
poor families with little to save, we choose not to model saving decisions. Given that the
sample families have very low income, not modeling saving decisions should not be very
restrictive.
2.2.2 Wage Equation
The log of the mother’s current-period wage is determined by a set of time-invariant char-
acteristics, including race, age at childbirth, age squared, number of years of education
,AFQT score, and decisions made in the last period as follows:
lnwt =φ1age+ φ2age
2 + φ3race+ φ4educ+ φ5AFQT + φ6
− δt+ φ7Et + φ8(Et × educ) + φ9pt−1 + φ10ft−1 + φ11Lst + ξt
(5)
18This parameter captures the psychological cost of separation from the child when the child is very
young. In practice, labor force participation in the first year will be slightly overestimated if we do not
include α7 in the estimate.
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where δ is the depreciation rate. Et =
∑t−1
−2 hτ is the mother’s cumulative work expe-
rience since the two periods prior to giving birth, and ft−1 and pt−1 indicate whether a
mother has worked full-time or part-time during the immediately preceding period, re-
spectively. The county-level labor market quality measure (the county unemployment
rate, employment share in services sector and average wage level) is Lst , where s is
the county in which the mother and her child reside at time t. Finally, ξt is the random
shock that is assumed to be i.i.d normal. Even though this assumption is not crucial in
estimations, it simplifies the estimation and the simulations.
2.2.3 Child’s Cognitive Attainment
We do not directly observe a child’s cognitive attainment (At). Instead, we use the child’s
test score observed after a child has turned six as a proxy. All children in the NLSY have
taken several cognitive achievement tests biannually, starting from when each child turned
six. We make use of the PIAT-Math as the outcome measure.19 Whenever a test score is
observed, the outcome (test score, lnOt ) of the child can be written as
lnOt = lnAt + γ15t+ µ0 + νt, (6)
where t is the child’s age (in months) when we observe the child’s first test score.20 µ0
is the mean test score and νt is the random disturbance drawn from a normal distribution
with mean of zero, and a variance of σ2ν . Together with Equation 2, the output production
19We choose mathematical attainment because it has shown to be mostly closely related to a child’s later
cognitive achievement (see for example, Claessens, Duncan and Engel, 2009). Bernal (2008) and Bernal
and Keane (2010 and 2011) assume three outcomes, PIAT-Math, PIAT-Reading and PPVT, are produced
by the same production function. In other words, a sample child can be used in the estimation at most three
times. They add two dummy variables in the outcome production function to separate which particular test
they use as dependent variable. In the context of a production function, such practice does not distinguish
the possibility that mothers’ same decisions can have potentially different effects on children’s different
cognitive attainments (saved for a level-shifter).
20Although the PIAT tests are given to each child biannually from age five onwards, some of the first
observed test scores are from later ages.
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function can be written as follows:
lnOt = lnA0+ γ1 ln
Yt
Nt
+ γ2Et+ γ3Wt+ γ4 lnA0Wt+ γ5 lnA0Et+ γ6t+µ0+ νt (7)
This equation, together with Equation 1, shows that, for example, the difference between
the mean test scores of males and females, everything else equal, can be captured by
γ8 + γ4γ8Et + γ5γ8Wt. This captures the possibility that a female child may have a
different early cognitive development experience compared to a male child especially in
households headed by a single mother. Time spent with the mother may stimulate girls
more compared to boys. Moreover, when the mother is working, child care choices may
affect boys and girls differently due to different gender socialization patterns. Similar
expressions can be derived for race and the mother’s characteristics at birth. By poten-
tially capturing unobserved social and developmental characteristics, these variables help
us control for the variation in cognitive development in response to the mother’s work
patterns and welfare use.
2.2.4 Unobserved Heterogeneity in Two Dimensions
In our setup, mothers are heterogeneous in terms of their tastes of work and welfare use. In
particular, α2 and α4, the utility function parameters regarding work and welfare use, are
determined by the (observed and unobserved) accumulated human capital at the time of
their children’s birth. Furthermore, we also assume mothers to be heterogeneous in their
unobserved tastes for welfare utilization, which separates mothers into “high type”(type
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I) and “low type”(type II).21 Specifically, α2 and α4 are specified as
α2 = α21educ+ α22race+ α2
α4k = α41educ+ α42race+ α4k, k = L,H,
(8)
where α4k is the unobserved component of taste for welfare use. We assume that there
are two different types (low, α4L, and high, α4H).
Furthermore, we assume that mothers with different tastes for welfare use also have
available different technologies in rearing their children. In particular, we link γ3, the
production function parameter regarding welfare use in Equation (7), with the two types
of welfare tastes: γ3H for a Type I mother and γ3L for a Type II mother.22 Associated type
proportions are denoted by piH and piL, which are parameters to be estimated.23
Note that the marginal effect of a mother’s welfare use on her child’s attainment is
∂Ot
∂Wt
= γ3 + γ4 lnA0.
By adding unobserved types on γ3, we allow for the intercept of the marginal effect of
welfare use to be different. However, we assume the interaction between mothers with
different welfare use types and children with different observed innate ability to be the
same. It is also possible to link γ4 with welfare types. As the empirical difference is
small, we omit it for simplicity.
21Unlike Bernal (2008), we only base types on mothers’ welfare use decisions. As a result, work deci-
sions of mothers with different unobserved tastes in welfare use differ only through potentially different in-
come resources. We have tried to impose unobserved heterogeneity on work taste here, but upon controlling
for the unobserved welfare taste, unobserved type parameters for work become unstable and insignificant
in magnitudes.
22Note that although γ3 is linked with α4, we allow the data to tell us whether γ3H > γ3L. That is, we do
not restrict that a mother who has lower welfare stigma (α4L) would use welfare-related non-cash benefits
less efficiently in investing in her child’s cognitive development.
23We choose not to link lnA0 with α4. In other words, we assume mothers of different tastes in welfare
use can give birth to children with the same observed ability, so long as their observed covariates are
identical.
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As a side note, we also choose not to allow the technology on using income (γ1) of
mothers of different types to vary. The reason is that after meeting basic survival needs,
poor families may not have extra monetary resources to invest in their children’s cognitive
development. This is confirmed as γˆ1 is not statistically significant.
In the following sections we explain the econometric model and the estimation.
2.3 The Likelihood Function
The individual likelihood function for individual i at time t with type k can be written as
Litk = {
I,II∑
k
pik[
J∑
j=1
dj Pr(dj = 1 | St, k)g(Ot | k)I[Ot available]]}f(wt | St)I[ht>0]
where f(wt | St)I(ht>0) is the probability of receiving a wage offer at wt if the mother is
working, conditional on the work experience and other state variables. g(Ot | k)I[Ot available]
is the probability of observing the test score Ot when a test is given to a child with a type
k mother at time t. The product of Litk across years gives us the individual likelihood
function. The natural logarithm of the product of individual likelihoods gives the log
likelihood function.
We estimate our model using the maximum likelihood (ML) method. We write V jt as
the value function of choice j in period t, and we need to solve it before we can compute
Pr(dj = 1 | St, k; θ). Given state variable St and the alternative-specific error term jt ,
we know that
V j(St, k, 
j
t , θ) = u
j
t + β
∫
′
max(V 1, V 2, ..., V J)dF (′).
The problem can then be solved by backward induction, as discussed in Appendix A.1.
We assume that the preference shocks  are drawn i.i.d. from the Type I extreme value dis-
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tribution with a location parameter of 0 and a scale parameter of 1. This enables us to write
the probability of choosing dj , given state St, as Pr(dj = 1 | St, k) = exp(V
j(St,k,dj))∑
k exp(V
k(St,k,dj))
.
2.4 Identification
The variation of benefits across states is often utilized in the literature to identify the ef-
fects of AFDC on work and welfare use behavior (see a complete review in Moffitt, 2002).
In this paper, we follow the same strategy. Furthermore, we also incorporate county labor
market information, measured by the county-level unemployment rate, employment share
in the service section and average wage level, as further sources of exogenous variation.
The benefit rule for the AFDC program of each state is a nonlinear function of a
mother’s income, work decisions, and number of children she has. Keane and Wolpin
(2002) find that empirical results vary widely in the literature mostly due to the adoption
of different benefit-rule parameters. They argue that the benefit level of a specific year
fails to capture the long-term changes in state AFDC rules, which are more likely to affect
mothers’ decisions in a dynamic setting. Instead of using randomly drawn, real benefit
levels, they suggest that researchers should estimate the long-term state-benefit rules and
use the estimated parameters as instruments.
Following the strategy of Keane and Wolpin (2002), we estimate the AFDC benefit
rules for each U.S. state by pooling all single-mother welfare receipts in the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1968 to 1992 and using dummy variables to identify
state benefit parameters. The AFDC benefit for a mother i who lives in state s is given by
the equation:
Bis = b0 + (b2 +
∑
s
b3sDs) · noCi + (b4 +
∑
s
b5sDs) · noCSqi
+ (b6 +
∑
s
b7sDs)Mi + (b8 +
∑
s
b9sDs)(wihi),
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where Ds is the indicator of the residence of individual i. Ds = 1 if mother i lives in
state s. noCi is the number of children in the household and noCSqi is the square of this
number. Mi is the unearned income and wihi is the labor income of the individual.
3 Data and Sample
The population of focus is children who were born to low-skilled single mothers. The
data come from Children of NLSY79. As most children start school at either age five or
six, we focus only on the first five years of cognitive development. During these early
years, the mother’s time, money and other inputs should have the most direct impact
on the child. The original data is recorded on a quarterly basis, but is converted into
yearly data for the purposes of the analysis. To measure attainment we make use of the
standardized math scores of the Peabody Individual Achievement Test. Since 1986, the
PIAT has been assessed biannually and given repeatedly to NLSY children from the age
of five. We use a child’s first observed math test scores to measure short-term attainment.
PIAT standardized test scores range from 65 to 135 with a mean of 100 and a standard
deviation of 15 based on the 1968 national norm sample of children.24
The NLSY mother-child pair sample is constructed on the basis of the following cri-
teria: (i) a child’s mother must have always been single within the first five years after
childbirth,25 (ii) the mother must have recoverable information for the first five years of
the child’s life, and (iii) the child must have at least one valid PIAT-math test score. Given
that we do not model initiatives of welfare reform at this point, we exclude children who
reside in U.S. states that implemented any state waiver programs or welfare reform during
their childhoods.
24PIAT test scores are known to have a potential “cohort effect.” Namely, latter cohorts have higher mean
test scores than previous cohorts. We deal with this issue by adding a cohort mean, µt, to the outcome,
Equation (7).
25Initially we include “sometimes single” mothers in our sample and also include the number of years
each mother was single as a control variable. Since the results are not significantly different, we exclude
these women from the final version of our analysis.
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3.1 Sample Description
In our sample, we have 2,820 observation-years from 564 children who were born to 392
single mothers (15,640 quarters in the original data). Table 1 reports the mean values of
the variables used in our analysis. The first panel of this table lists the means of work
and welfare variables in the first five years after birth. Defined as having reported positive
welfare income for more than one quarter in a year, the childhood welfare participation
rate of this group of children is 79.4 percent. Of our sample, 12.8 percent of the mothers
worked part-time during their children’s childhood, whereas 18.6 percent of them worked
full-time. In other words, the labor force participation rate for this group of low-skilled
mothers is roughly 31.4 percent. The sample of children consists of a nearly equal share
of males and females. Our sample is predominantly black (74 percent). The average
PIAT-math score is 93.1, which is significantly lower than the mean test score of the
1968 norm population. This is indicative of the disadvantage of growing up poor. On
average, women are about 25.5 years old at the birth of their child. This is younger than
the NLSY79 mothers’ average age of 27. Sample mothers, on average, have 10.9 years
of education and two children. Also, those who have worked receive a mean annual labor
income of $10,737 (in 2000 dollars). The AFQT score used in the analysis is a percentile
score. Table 1 indicates that our average mother is at the 14th percentile of the AFQT
distribution, corresponding to a raw score of about 140. (AFQT raw scores vary between
80 and 320.)
We also consider three county-level characteristics to determine labor market quality
while estimating the initial and current wages.26 These are shown in table 1, which re-
ports that our sample mothers tend to live in counties with higher unemployment rates
(the average unemployment rate in these counties is 7.9 percent while the comparable na-
tional average is 6.8 percent), high shares of service industry (the average share of service
industry in the sample states is 16.5 percent, and the national average is 15.8 percent), and
26We follow children who were born in different calendar years from birth to age six. The county-level
and national statistics reported here are the means over the first five years of each child’s life across all
sample children.
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low median income (the median income in the sample counties is $23,967, whereas the
national average for the same period is $27,019).27
Table 2 further distinguishes a mother’s welfare use and work decisions according to
her child’s age. Because pre-birth decisions are incorporated as the initial state variables,
the table contains information starting from two years before a child’s birth. Comparing
pre- and post-birth welfare use, we note that single mothers have increased welfare use by
a minimum of 10 percentage points due to giving birth to a new child. Labor force partic-
ipation only seems to be affected in the first year after childbirth. In fact, mothers’ mean
hours of work (conditional on having work) increase significantly after their children turn
one-year-old.
We take a closer look at the distribution of individual characteristics and distribution
of test scores by these characteristics in Table 3. From this table, we first see that more
than 75 percent of the children who were raised by low-skilled single mothers score below
the population mean (100) because the mean test score of the third quartile is only 93.3.
Next, for each of the variables used in the analysis, we report the quartile means and for
each of these quartiles we report the mean test score observed. For example, the second
quartile mean of real hourly wages is $2.60. For children whose mothers’ wages fall
into this quartile, the mean test score is 92.4. The distributions of children’s test scores
based on different quartiles of labor and other incomes indicate that there is not a close
connection between children’s childhood financial wellbeing and their test scores.28
The next set of mothers’ characteristics, shown in Table 3, are AFQT score, edu-
cation level,29 and age at childbirth. Given our sampling strategy, no mothers in our
sample received more than twelve years of schooling. We divide our sample into two
groups,depending upon their years of education, fewer than twelve years and exactly
27All monetary variables are adjusted to year 2000 dollars by the Personal Consumption Expenditure
Deflator for nondurable goods (PCED-nondurable).
28To get a measure of general financial wellbeing while children grow up, we take an average of the wage
and income measures over the study period. Other income is defined as annual family income minus labor
and welfare income (welfare income includes AFDC and food stamps benefits).
29This is measured at the child’s birth. We exclude all mothers who were in school during the sampling
window.
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twelve years, and summarize children’s test scores accordingly. One can see that there
is a significant positive correlation between a mother’s AFQT scores and her child’s test
scores and between a mother’s education level and her child’s test scores. In terms of age
at birth, the descriptive statistics seem to suggest that children of older mothers tend to
have lower scores. However, as will be seen later in the same table, this correlation may
be explained by the fact that older mothers also tend to have more children, and hence
fewer resources available for each child.
The next group of variables is children’s characteristics, including race, gender and
number of siblings. Even though all of the sample children grew up in disadvantaged
backgrounds, Black and Hispanic children have lower test scores than their non-Black,
non-Hispanic counterparts. Also, girls perform better than boys, on average. In terms
of numbers of siblings, we divide the children into five groups by number of siblings:
children with no sibling, with one sibling, with two siblings, with three siblings, and
with more than three siblings. We see a negative correlation between a child’s PIAT-math
test score and number of siblings. For example, children with no siblings have a mean
test score of 95.7, but the mean score of children with more than three siblings is just
90.2. As a result, this variable seems to have captured the effect of defused resources
that an economically constrained mother can invest in each of her children. We also
summarize children’s test scores by their ages taking the test. As can be seen, there does
not exist a significant correlation between age when taking the test and test scores. This
is reasonable, as the standardized test score we use has already adjusted for this factor.
Finally, we look at the test score distribution based on the county unemployment rate,
employment ratio of the service industry workers and medium income level. Again, there
is no clear pattern between these county characteristics and resident children’s test scores.
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4 Results
4.1 Parameter Estimates
The subjective depreciation rate (β), and depreciation of human capital (δ) are not esti-
mated with the main model. We adopt these two values from Bernal (2008). β is set at
0.92, while δ is set at 0.003.30 Except for these two values, we structurally estimate the
remaining parameters in the wage equation, the mother’s utility function and the child’s
cognitive achievement equation.
Table 4 lists the estimates of Equation 5, the log-wage function. The coefficients
are all in the expected directions. Both work experiences (part-time and full-time) by
themselves and the interaction of them with education increase hourly wages, whereas
a higher unemployment rate in a county is associated with lower wage. Conversely, a
higher county service employment ratio and mean income are positively correlated with
local wage offers. According to the estimates, an extra year of work increases wages by
one percentage point, which is quite similar to estimates from the literature.
Table 5 reports the estimates of utility function parameters, demonstrated by Equation
(4). We find that λ is 0.52, which indicates that a mother has an incentive to invest more
in a child with lower cognitive development. A mother’s taste for work (α2) is captured
by a term that is invariant to everyone (α2), her years of education, and her ethnicity. The
estimates suggest that mothers generally value leisure (α2 is negative). Mothers who have
more years of education tend to dislike work more, which is also found by Bernal (2008).
Furthermore, we find that on average, Black mothers receive slightly higher utility from
work than their counterparts.31
30For the discount factor (β) however, we convert Bernal’s quarterly discount rate (0.98) to the annual
rate, which is 0.92.
31However, this positive coefficient is far from enough to outweigh the negative utility of work from
other components in α2. Bernal (2008) finds that compared to mothers of other ethnicities, Black mothers
perceive a larger negative utility from work. However, Bernal also finds that Black mothers receive a higher
positive utility from using child care. The combined effect of the two decisions is that Black mothers receive
a positive utility from working and using child care simultaneously. Since we do not model child care use
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We also find that a mother receives a significantly positive utility from her child’s
cognitive achievement (a highly positive α3), which is quite reasonable.32 In the utility
function, α4 captures the negative utility from using welfare in each period. We allow α4
to vary across individuals by years of education, ethnicity and also by attitude towards
welfare (as high-stigma mothers [Type I] and low-stigma mothers[Type II]). As can be
seen from the estimates, other things equal, mothers who are better educated are more
inclined to use welfare (if they are eligible). Also, Black mothers have a higher welfare
stigma than mothers of other ethnicity. On the other hand, there are indeed two very
distinctive types in terms of welfare stigma (α4H and α4L). Mothers with higher welfare
stigma receive three times higher the utility cost (-2.07 as opposed to -0.65) from using
welfare than their counterparts. We will discuss the implications of welfare types in detail
in Section 4.3.
In the mother’s utility function, there are three initiation costs: first-time using welfare
after the child’s birth (α5), first job since giving birth (α6) and working in the first year
after child’s birth (α7). We see that mothers receive a negative α5 that is higher than all
α4 combined. As a result, we know mothers not only receive negative utility from using
welfare, but also a much higher disutility from initiating it. This explains why many
eligible single mothers choose not to participate in the welfare program. On the other
hand, both α6 and α7 are negative. This reflects the fact that many mothers chose not to
work in the first year after their children’s birth.
The main set of parameters we are interested in is the achievement production func-
tion parameters, Equation (7), which is reported in Table 6. Note that the coefficients here
refer to the child’s log achievement (log-standardized PIAT-Math test score). First, we
discuss estimates that comprise the observed innate ability (lnA0). This is captured by
a set of observed time-invariant factors, including the child’s birth weight, gender, eth-
decisions, our work decision may have captured the average utility effects from both employment and child
care use decisions.
32Note that our cognitive achievement term, lnAt, does not have a constant term. The constant term is
added in the outcome equation, Equation (7). It affects the relative scale of α3 but does not change the
qualitative result.
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nicity, whether the mother gave birth before age 18 (mother’s too young) or after age 33
(mother’s too old), her number of years of education and her AFQT score. We also in-
clude whether the mother has prior welfare and work experiences before the child’s birth
in the observed innate ability function. The estimates are all in the direction we have seen
in the literature (and in particular, Bernal (2008) and Bernal and Keane (2010 and 2011)).
For example, birth weight is highly positively correlated with the observed test score. On
average, girls perform better than boys. Both the mother’s number of years of education
and her AFQT score are highly correlated with the child’s test score. Additionally, while
whether a mother was too young when giving birth is not statistically correlated with the
child’s test score, being born to a mother who is older is positively correlated with the
child’s observed innate ability. Also, having no prior welfare experiences and more prior
work experiences are significantly associated with a higher observed innate ability.
In terms of the effects of the mother’s work and welfare use decisions, we focus on
the marginal effects of an additional year of a mother’s decisions on her child’s test score.
In our setup, marginal effects of work (E) and welfare use (W ) on the cognitive outcome
depend on a child’s innate log-achievement level, lnA0. The effect of employment on
a child’s cognitive achievement is assumed to be homogeneous in our model, which is
∂ lnO
∂ lnE
= 0.0068− 0.0011 ∗ lnA0.
Meanwhile, we assume that the marginal effect of welfare use on the cognitive achieve-
ment production function is heterogeneous on the intercept but homogeneous on the
interaction terms (inputs interacted with innate ability, lnA0).33 The welfare effects
of Type I and Type II mothers on children’s attainment are hence given by ∂ lnO
∂ lnWh
=
0.0797 − 0.1770 ∗ lnA0 and ∂ lnO∂ lnWl = 0.0609 − 0.1770 ∗ lnA0, respectively. Note that
a mother’s type of welfare use in the utility function and the production function of the
child’s cognitive attainment is linked. Ex-ante, a so-called high welfare stigma mother
(higher α4) is not necessarily associated with a better child rearing technology (higher
γ3). However, the data suggests that this is indeed the case.
33We have estimated a version allowing heterogeneity on the interaction term as well. However, the
difference is small. We drop the term for simplicity.
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Our estimates indicate that the observed innate ability (lnA0) ranges from 0.095577 to
0.484886. Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(b) draw the marginal effects of work and welfare use,
respectively, against the distribution of lnA0. Figure 1(a) indicates that a mother’s work
improves her child’s math test score, but the effect declines with the child’s innate ability.
Everything else being constant, the marginal change in attainment resulting from a one
year increase in work ranges from 0.45 percent at the lowest innate ability to 0.41 percent
at the highest, with the median effect (the marked dashed line) at about 0.426 percent.
The highest, lowest and median marginal effects translate to the standardized test scores
of .419, .382 and .396 points, respectively. This means that returns for time with a child
are higher if a child has high observed innate ability.
Figure 1(b) lists the marginal effects of welfare use for the two types of mothers
against all possible ranges of the observed innate ability. Table 7 shows that there are
64 percent Type I mothers (mothers with α4H and corresponding γ3H), and that the re-
maining 36 percent are considered as Type II mothers (with α4L and γ3L). For a Type
I mother, the net marginal effect of welfare use on her child ranges from 6.3 percent to
-0.62 percent points, with a median of 2.2 percent. This effect is quite substantial, as it
translates to a 2.07 points increase in the mean PIAT-Math test score. As a result, a Type
I mother, although with higher disutility, can potentially benefit her child greatly from
using welfare, save for children with the highest innate ability levels for whom welfare
has a detrimental effect.
On the contrary, for about half of the children with Type II mothers, the net effect of
welfare use on the child’s cognitive achievement is negative. The net effect of welfare
use on this kind of child ranges from 4.5 percent to -2.41 percent log points per year,
with an effect on median child 0.417 percent, which is about .387 points increase in
the standardized test score. Recall that the coefficients of welfare use in the attainment
production function, Equation (7), capture the benefits from in-kind transfer programs
such as Medicaid, Head Start or subsidized child care. We would expect Medicaid to
have universal benefit for all participants. However, Head Start or subsidized child care
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may benefit a child with lower observed innate ability more compared to the higher innate
ability counterpart. Furthermore, if there is a negative role model effect, the benefits of
these programs may not be enough for high ability children to overcome the detrimental
effect of a negative role model.
Chyi and Ozturk (2012) estimate a similar attainment production function as Equa-
tion (7) using a correction function approach. In that study, they find that the marginal
effects of an additional year of employment and welfare use for a child with median level
of innate ability are at 1.44% (1.34 points) and .649% (.604 points), respectively.34 Both
current estimates from the structural model have the same signs as the reduced-form es-
timates. However, both estimates are smaller than the estimates derived from Chyi and
Ozturk (2012). The structural estimates of the marginal effects of employment is .397
point, whereas the marginal effects of welfare use are 2.06 and .387 points for type I and
II mothers, respectively. As a result, the reduced form estimation gives a higher employ-
ment effect but a lower welfare use effect. After closely examining the regressors, we
realize that in the structural model, two regressors: a mother’s prior welfare and prior
work experiences (from eight quarters prior her child’s birth) are not included in the re-
duced form version. As a result, the structural model estimates can be seen as partial effect
conditional on specific levels of prior-birth decisions, whereas in the reduced form ver-
sion, the effects of a mother’s decisions incorporate not only the above-mentioned effect,
but also the effect from the positive correlation between pre- and post-decisions.35
This estimated positive employment effect, however small in magnitude, is signifi-
cantly different from Bernal (2008) and Bernal and Keane (2010 and 2011), who find that
a mother’s employment is detrimental to a child’s cognitive achievement. For example,
34In Chyi and Ozturk (2012), the dependent variable, PIAT Math Standardized test score, is not in log-
arithm. We convert these marginal effects in points to percentages by dividing them with the median test
score, which is 93.1 in the sample.
35The effect of inclusion of prior decisions in the outcome function can be seen from the below illustra-
tion. Suppose the following (simplified) outcome equation is the “true” model:
lnOt = β0 +X
′
tβ + β1prior work + β2prior welfare
+ β3Et + β4Wt + β5prior work× Et + β5prior welfare×Wt.
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Bernal (2008) finds that the quarterly marginal effect of employment ranges from 0.33
percent to -0.7 percent, with a mean of -0.25 percent. After a closer look at their sam-
ple, we find several potential sources of sampling variation between their studies and ours
that may explain the different estimates. Appendix A.2 provides a detailed comparison
between our empirical strategies and an explanation of the variation of our results. Here
we summarize the key findings. First, Bernal (2008) focuses on a population of better-
skilled mothers, who potentially may have different child rearing technology and children
of much higher innate abilities. Second, Bernal and Keane (2010 and 2011) study the ef-
fect of child care focusing on a group of single mothers that also includes better-educated
mothers. Finally, since NLSY79 does not provide detailed child care information, they
use employment as a proxy. We find that about 20 percent of our sample reported using
child care in the first three years but no employment. However, such cases are defined
as having worked in Bernal and Keane (2010 and 2011). Using a reduced form approach
listed in Appendix A.2, we find that such variations in the definition of employment ex-
plains a significant part of the variation between our results.
In this case,
∂ lnOt
∂Et
|prior exp. = β3 + β5prior exp.
∂ lnOt
∂Wt
|prior exp. = β4 + β5prior exp.,
where ”prior exp.” indicates both prior work and welfare use experiences.
On the other hand, if we do not control prior experiences, as is the case in Chyi and Ozturk (2012), the
marginal effects of the mother’s decisions become:
∂ lnOt
∂Et
=
∂ lnOt
∂Et
|prior exp. + (β1 + β5Et)
∂prior work
∂Et
+ (β2 + β5Wt)
∂prior welfare
∂Et
,
∂ lnOt
∂Wt
=
∂ lnOt
∂Wt
|prior exp. + (β1 + β5Et)
∂prior work
∂Wt
+ (β2 + β5Wt)
∂prior welfare
∂Wt
Given the highly positive correlations between pre- and post-birth same decisions, and the highly negative
correlations between pre- and post-birth cross decisions, it is easy to see that positive β1 and negative β2
and β5 can result in the reduced form version capturing a much higher employment effect while a much
smaller welfare use effect. Also see Appendix A.2 for a further discussion.
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4.2 Model Fit
Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b) provide support for how well the model fits the data. Overall,
we fit the participation rates for welfare and work nicely. We predict more than 96 percent
of mothers’ welfare behavior and 93 percent of work choices successfully. However, our
estimation of welfare misses about 4 percentage points in the first period (an underesti-
mation) and in the last period (an overestimation). At the same time, our prediction for
work is understated slightly in the middle three periods (5 percentage points on average).
4.3 Understanding Unobserved Heterogeneity
Table 7 collects all parameters that are related to different types of mothers. Figure 3
draws the annual means of welfare use and work patterns for mothers of different types.
As can be expected, they have noticeable differences in terms of welfare use, as mothers
with higher welfare stigma (Type I mothers) use slightly less welfare since their children’s
birth. On the other hand, there is no significant difference in employment patterns between
mothers who have different degrees of welfare stigma. As discussed before, we assume
the distaste of work in the utility function to be the same between the two types of mothers.
The difference in work patterns is hence generated initially, through variation in income
from their different welfare use patterns and later, through variation in wage offers through
different accumulated work experiences.
The difference in children’s annual attainment (lnAt) between the two types of moth-
ers is much larger, as can be seen in Figure 3. Through their different rearing technology,
γ5, even similar employment and welfare patterns allowed Type I mothers to better uti-
lize the benefits brought by participating in welfare programs to educate their children.
As a result, better rearing technology of Type I mothers becomes the dominant effect that
their children will have a much higher attainment than their counterparts who have similar
observed innate ability.
The fact that we have more Type I mothers is encouraging. First, since the effects
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of employment is mostly positive, policies that are pro-employment will be beneficial
to most children’s attainment. On the other hand, policies that curb welfare use will
not affect children born to Type I mothers ex-post, as their mothers do not use welfare
much anyway. As for children born to Type II mothers, reducing welfare use actually is
beneficial for at least half of them, given that the marginal effect of welfare use is negative
for children with more than the median level of observed innate ability.
Based on this discussion, we see the benefit of allowing mothers to have different
tastes in using welfare and then linking this taste with mothers’ technologies for rearing
their children. By estimating the proportion of the two types of mothers in the data and
the different technologies of utilizing a welfare benefit, we are able to disentangle further
the potential effects of welfare reform initiatives on children’s attainment.
5 Policy Analysis
Using the estimated parameters, we simulate the effects of three policy changes. These
policy changes gauge mothers’ behavioral responses facing (i) a welfare time limit and
work requirement, (ii) a relief of welfare tax on labor income and (iii) a policy that is
similar to maternity leave. In each policy exercise, we look at the changes in work and
welfare participation and analyze how achievement measures differ for children of women
with different work and welfare choices.
5.1 Time Limit on Welfare and Work Requirement
According to the new TANF rules, the longest time one can be on welfare without working
is two years, and the cumulative welfare use cannot exceed five years. We simulate this
policy by setting benefits to zero if cumulative welfare use exceeds two years and no
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work is chosen.36 Figures 4(a) and 4(b) document the behavioral responses for an average
mother whose observed covariates are at the sample mean. As can be seen from the Figure
4(b), welfare choice decreases by about one percentage point in the first two periods. After
that, welfare participation decreases sharply by about 13 percentage points. Meanwhile,
the increase in work participation is also significant (Figure 4(a)). The employment rate
goes up by about 9 percentage points in the first two periods. In the last three periods, this
increase reaches more than 30 percentage points.
These results indicate that the combination of a welfare time limit and work require-
ment has a sizable effect on mothers’ behaviors. The explanation is straight-forward.
Considering a typical mother who currently gets all of her income from welfare, accord-
ing to the new TANF rules, she will no longer be able to receive a welfare benefit after
the first two years. Thus, she will choose to work to make up for the lost income, which
is exactly the reason for the sharp increase in employment rates after two periods. Note
that in our model, one can find employment so long as one wants to. Since we do not
model the job matching difficulty and a mother’s searching intensity, the insurance aspect
of welfare use is not factored into our model. As a result, welfare use does not decline by
as much as what we have seen in real life.
Our results are in line with other studies on the effects of welfare reform on mothers’
behaviors. For example, Fang and Keane (2004) also focus on single mothers and find that
both work requirements and welfare time limits, after controlling for other factors such as
the 1993 EITC expansion and the unprecedented economic expansion in the 1990s, can
largely account for the decrease in the welfare participation rate and the increase in the
work participation rate. Furthermore, Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003) argue that the
effects of welfare time limits may be largest on mothers who have younger children, since
they value the insurance purpose of the welfare program more.
Finally, this policy increases the mean of simulated test scores by about 1.8 percent
(or a 1.68 points increase in test score. See Figure 4(c)). Even though our model is naive
36Since we only model the first five years of a child’s live, it is not possible for us to impose the five-year
time limit.
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in the sense that we have not taken into account the difficulty of finding a job, we find
that at least at the mean level, the negative impact of welfare reduction on achievement is
dominated by the positive impact of increasing work on achievement. Our prediction is
also supported by Miller and Zhang (2009), who pursue a difference-in-difference strategy
using fourth and eighth graders from both pre- and post- welfare reform years. Their
findings complement ours by showing the persistence of early gains up to the eighth grade
level. Both our paper and Miller and Zhang (2009) indicate that children with lower
innate ability gain more from welfare reform. This implies that the differential returns to
employment and welfare use by innate ability also persist in the long run.
5.2 Eliminate Welfare Tax on Labor Income
In this experiment, we relax the relationship between the welfare use decision and the
work decision. We simulate this policy by assuming that work income would not reduce
the benefit from welfare use (in other words, we set b8 +
∑
s
b9sDs = 0).
With this policy change, work would be more attractive to mothers who are on welfare
because now working income will not have a negative effect on the welfare benefit. The
increase in work decisions is about 6.5 percentage points in the first period. Then it
increases gradually to 12 percentage points in the last period. However, this policy change
only has a slightly positive effect on welfare use (see Figures 5(a) and 5(b)). Still, the
impact of this policy reform on children’s ability achievement is implicit. The increase of
mean log achievement is only about 0.46 percent (or .43 point in standardized test score.
See Figure 5(c)), which is far smaller than the effect of a combination of welfare time
limit and work requirement as proposed in the previous experiment.
As a result, if the policy goal is to promote work, reducing welfare tax on labor income
can be a valid alternative in the sense that it sharply increases employment. Furthermore,
it slightly increases the attainment of children whose mothers are on welfare.
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5.3 Maternity Leave Policy
In this experiment, we analyze the impact of a maternity leave policy (beyond the 4 weeks
that is allowed in US now) for which there is no wage penalty for the time out of the
labor market after giving birth. This policy change is brought about by setting the wage
depreciation rate of the first year to zero.37
This policy change would have no effect on those mothers who do not have work
experiences before giving birth. Thus, we focus on the proportion of the sample who
worked before giving birth (only 42% of the whole sample). With this policy change, the
employment rate decreases by about nine percentage points in the first year. After the first
period, the growth in employment appears to follow a similar trend as those in the real
data. As a result, this policy decreases the initial employment in the first year after birth
for those people who have prior work experiences, and the employment rate for this group
fails to catch up in the later periods as well. On the contrary, the increase in welfare use is
minuscule in the first two periods. Then it increases sharply from three percentage points
to ten percentage points. (See Figures 6(a) and 6(b).)
Because the maternity leave policy decreases the wage depreciation cost of leaving
a job, fewer mothers would choose to work in the first period after giving birth. This
reduction would continue for the remaining periods because less benefit is received from
the working experience. At the same time, these mothers would rather choose welfare
to make up for the loss of their income. However, this policy reform has little impact
on children’s achievement. The decrease of mean log achievement is only about 0.68
percent. (See Figure 6(c).)
The type of policy change we have simulated, although new in the U.S., is still much
lower than in other developed countries. Most OECD countries offer up to 14 months
maternity leave, and Canada recently increased its maternity leave from 6 months to a full
year. When Canada changed its maternity leave policy, the percentage of mothers who
37In the second year wage equation (lnw2 in Equation (5)), we also set the work premium terms for the
second year after child-birth (corresponding to φ9 and φ10) equal to the work premium in the first year after
child-birth.
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went back to work within the first nine months declined significantly, from 53 percent to
about 33 percent (Baker and Milligan, 2008).
Note that this policy experiment only applies to about 40% of our sample mothers
who have prior-birth work experiences. As a result, the average effect on the whole pop-
ulation is even smaller. Our finding of a decrease in labor force participation is in line
with the findings of Baker and Milligan (2008), who find that when Canada changed
its maternity leave policy, the percentage of mothers who went back to work within the
first nine months declined significantly, from 53 percent to about 33 percent. Further-
more, Han, Ruhm, Waldfogel and Washbrook (2009) also find that within nine months
of leaving work after child birth, about 60 percent of all women go back to work. This
is especially high among Black, new mothers who are the majority of our welfare users.
They further indicate that women who are non-college graduates, young and single are the
individuals who are most likely to go back to work within two months of birth, whereas
mothers who are older, married, and at least college graduates are the least likely, because
they are likely to have savings to draw upon and access to maternity leave through their
workplaces.
6 Conclusion
Even though our data and model are restricted for simplicity, our results reveal significant
and interesting policy effects. We allow welfare to affect cognitive development through
multiple channels. Cumulative income input captures the income effect of welfare use.
A work experience variable captures the effects of time spent with the child by substitut-
ing welfare for work. Once these two channels are controlled for, a welfare-use variable
captures mainly the benefits from nonpecuniary means-tested transfers programs that are
linked with the welfare program, such as Medicaid. The effect of welfare use is identified
not only by a comparison between children with and without childhood welfare experi-
ences, but also by comparing children who have different levels of exposure to the welfare
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program during the first five years after birth. Also, we include parameters of the AFDC
benefit determination rule for each U.S. state and a measure of county-level labor market
tightness for added exogenous variation for identification.
We use the first observed PIAT-math scores from the Children of NLSY79 as a mea-
sure of attainment. We find that a mother’s employment benefits a child’s cognitive de-
velopment, especially if the child has low innate ability. These results are significantly
different from the literature which documents negative cognitive achievement responses
to a mother’s employment. We find work to be non-detrimental to test scores, a widely
used measure of cognitive development in the literature. This positive impact may be
capturing the effect that working mothers provide a positive role model for their children
to follow.
We link the mothers’ different tastes for welfare use with their different technologies
in rearing their children. For Type I mothers, who suffer more stigma in welfare use,
welfare participation has a positive effect on a child’s achievement because they can better
utilize benefits brought from the welfare program. However, for children with Type II
mothers, one extra year on welfare reduces the mean test score if their innate ability
is at an above average level. The coefficients of welfare use in our model capture the
benefits from in-kind transfer programs, such Head Start or subsidized child care. These
two may be benefiting low ability children more than high ability children. However, the
benefits from these programs may not be enough for high ability children to overcome
the influence of a negative role model if Type II mothers utilize these benefits with bad
technology to rear their children.
By estimating the structural parameters, we are also able to conduct counterfactual
policy analysis to investigate the effects of policy changes. We find that the work require-
ment and welfare limit introduced by welfare reform simultaneously reduces a single
mother’s use of welfare and increases her work choice possibility. The combination of a
time limit on welfare and a work requirement increases test scores by about 1.8 percent.
One other paper, Miller and Zhang (2009), documents positive effects of welfare reform
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on the cognitive measures of welfare children.
We also looked at two policies that are not currently implemented but maybe of in-
terest: a maternal leave policy and a relief of welfare tax on labor income. We find that
the introduction of a maternal leave policy increases welfare participation by about 6 per-
centage points. While it increases the employment rate about 9 percentage points in the
first period, this effect decreases gradually thereafter. Consequently simulated test scores
decrease by 0.68 percent. A policy of exempting labor income for welfare tax, on the
contrary, increases test scores by 0.42 percent. This policy increases employment by 10
percentage points on the average but only has limited positive effect on welfare use.
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Tables and Graphs
Table 1: Sample Descriptives - Means
Mother’s Decisions Mother’s Characteristics
Welfare participation 0.794 Age at Birth 25.5
(0.404) (4.4)
Annual Employment Years of Education 10.9
Part-Time .128 (1.6)
(500-1499 hours) (0.335) Number of Children 2.4
Full-Time 0.186 (1.3)
(>= 1500 hours) (0.389) Annual Labor 10,737.2
Hours of Work 1605 Income∗ (9,070.4)
( Conditional on work) (626) Annual Other 6,063.0
Income∗ (33,938.9)
Child’s Characteristics AFQT 14.2
Female/Male 0.48/0.52 (14.0)
Black/Others 0.74/0.26 County Characteristics
Birth Weight(Ounces) 110.7 Unemployment Rate 7.8
(22.9) (3.2)
Age Taking Test (Quarters) 25.3 Service Industry 0.16
(4.8) (0.04)
PIAT-Math Score 93.1 Medium Income 23,967.1
(13.4) (6,228.3)
Child-Years 2,820
Children 564
Mothers 392
- Standard errors are in parentheses.
- Population weighted to reflect the 1979 national population of low-skilled single
mothers.
* In 2000 dollars deflated by PCED-nondurable.
Table 2: Mother’s Employment and Welfare Use by Child’s
Age
Child’s Welfare Part-Time Full-Time Hours
Age Use (500-1499 Hours) (≥ 1500 Hours) of Work†
-2 0.54 0.16 0.18 1510
(0.50) (0.36) (0.39) (628)
-1 0.67 0.15 0.17 1519
(0.47) (0.36) (0.37) (657)
1 0.81 0.11 0.12 1463
(0.39) (0.31) (0.32) (538)
2 0.79 0.13 0.17 1532
(0.41) (0.34) (0.38) (600)
3 0.81 0.12 0.19 1625
(0.39) (0.32) (0.39) (633)
4 0.80 0.13 0.22 1692
(0.40) (0.34) (0.42) (684)
5 0.76 0.15 0.22 1651
(0.43) (0.35) (0.42) (618)
- Standard errors are in parentheses.
†
Conditional on work.
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Table 3: Detailed Descriptive Statistics of Test Scores by Quartiles of
Demographic Characteristics
Quartile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
PIAT-Math Score 75.60 89.40 98.40 111.02
(5.56) (2.67) (2.75) (6.43)
Mother’s Characteristics
Real Hourly Wages† 1.1 2.6 4.8 10.6
Mean Standard Test Scores 94.8 92.4 95.8 96.7
(Standard Deviation of Scores) (13.7) (14.8) (12.5) (12.7)
Average Labor Income† 181.6 1010.9 3598.1 11,823.2
94.8 97.3 93.2 96.2
(13.4) (13.6) (13.2) (12.2)
Average Other Income 479.0 1919.4 4126.5 19,805.8
94.0 93.5 93.6 94.8
(14.50) (13.90) (12.90) (12.70)
AFQT Score 3.0 7.8 14.0 34.9
90.2 92.3 94.1 96.7
(13.2) (12.8) (12.5) (14.3)
Education < 12 = 12
91.4 94.7
(13.60) (13.30)
Age at Birth 21.1 25.0 28.4 33.7
93.9 93.5 92.6 92.0
(13.20) (13.40) (13.20) (14.00)
Child’s Characteristics
Race Black Hispanic Other
73.8 12.9 13.3
93.6 92.2 97.8
(11.89) (13.59) (13.24)
Gender Male Female
92.6 93.6
(13.80) (13.03)
Number of Siblings 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 > 3
95.7 95.3 93.0 90.7 90.2
(13.62) (13.73) (12.53) (13.00) (14.10)
Age Taking Test 21.2 24.1 26.4 32.1
(Quarters) 91.6 94.6 93.3 92.5
(14.70) (12.70) (12.50) (13.50)
County Characteristics
Unemployment Rate 4.7 6.5 8.3 12.3
93.5 93.2 93.0 92.7
(14.0) (13.6) (12.8) (13.4)
Service Industry 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.22
93.9 92.4 92.2 94.0
(13.7) (13.0) (12.5) (14.4)
Medium Income 15,433.50 21,000.50 25,317.30 31,582.70
92.4 94.1 92.3 93.7
(13.4) (14.0) (13.1) (13.1)
- Standard errors are in parentheses.
† Conditional on work.
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Table 4: Log-wage Estimates
Variables Coefficient
Time-Invariant
Years of Schooling (φ1) 0.0634
(0.0200)
Years of Schooling Squared (φ2) -0.0010
(0.0010)
Race (φ3) -0.0030
(0.0200)
Education (φ4) 0.0046
(0.0010)
AFQT (φ5) 0.0011
(0.0030)
Constant (φ6) 0.5155
(0.1800)
Experience-Related
Work Experience (φ7) 0.0074
(0.0040)
Education*Experience (φ8) 0.0000
(0.0000)
Part-Time Premium (φ9) 0.1171
(0.0200)
Full-Time Premium (φ10) 0.2396
(0.0002)
County Characteristics (φ11)
Unemployment Rate -0.0007
(0.0002)
Services Industry 0.0170
(0.0200)
Medium Income 0.0024
(0.002)
- Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5: Utility Parameters
Variables Coefficient
λ 0.518
(0.0010)
Consumption (α1) 0.798
(0.0003)
Taste for Work (α2)
Disutility from Work (α2) -5.13
(0.0020)
Mother’s Education on Taste for Work (α21) -0.0050
(0.0002)
Mother’s Race on Taste for Work (α22) 0.0100
(0.0002)
Ability of the Child (α3) 4.98
(0.021)
Taste for Welfare (α4)
Mother’s Education on Taste for Welfare (α41) 0.0747
(0.0002)
Mother’s Race on Taste for Welfare (α42) -0.102
(0.0002)
Disutility from Welfare Type I (α4H) -2.07
(0.01)
Disutility from Welfare Type II (α4L) -0.649
(0.01)
First Year on Welfare after Birth (α5) -3.61
(0.003)
First Job after Birth (α6) -1.14
(0.02)
Work in First Year after Birth (α7) -0.697
(0.02)
- Standard errors are in parentheses.
43
Table 6: Initial and Current Ability Parameters
Variables Coefficient
Initial Ability Parameters
Birth Weight (γ6) 0.0009
(0.000)
Gender (γ7) 0.0147
(0.001)
Race (γ8) -0.0308
(0.000)
Mother Too Young Dummy (γ9) -0.0371
(0.029)
Mother Too Old Dummy (γ10) 0.0618
(0.001)
Education of Mother (γ11) 0.0317
(0.001)
AFQT (γ12) 0.0014
(0.001)
Prior Welfare (γ13) -0.0623
(0.001)
Prior Work (γ14) 0.0409
(0.001)
Current Ability Parameters
Cumulative Income (γ1) -0.0062
(0.050)
Cumulative Work Experience (γ2) 0.0100
(0.000)
Cumulative Years on Welfare of Type I (γ3h) 0.0781
(0.005)
Cumulative Years on Welfare of Type II (γ3l) 0.0604
(0.005)
Cumulative Years on Welfare*Initial Ability (γ4) -0.1753
(0.050)
Cumulative Work Experience*Initial Ability (γ5) -0.0043
(0.001)
Outcome
Age (γ15) 0.0873
(0.002)
Mean Test Score (µ0) 3.68
(0.05)
- Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 7: Type-Related Parameters
Variables Coefficient
Type Proportions
Type I Stigma from Benefit Use (pih) 0.641
Type II Stigma from Benefit Use (pil) 0.359
Welfare Stigma
Disutility from Welfare Type I (α4H) -2.070
(0.010)
Disutility from Welfare Type II (α4L) -0.649
(0.010)
Rearing Technology
Cumulative Years on Welfare of Type I (γ3h) 0.0781
(0.005)
Cumulative Years on Welfare of Type II (γ3l) 0.0604
(0.005)
- Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Effects of Mothers’ Decisions on Ability Given Initial Ability
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−
.
02
−
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
.
05
.
06
.
07
.095577 .484886
Initial Ability
dInA/dW for High Type dInA/dW for Low Type
.32635
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Figure 2: Model Fitness of Mothers’ Decisions
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(a) Model Fitness of Work Decision
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Figure 3: Participation and Attainment of Different Types
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Figure 4: Effect of Time Limit on Welfare and Work Requirement
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Figure 5: Effect of Taking Off Welfare Tax
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Figure 6: Effect of Maternity Leave Policy
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Appendix
A.1 Solution to the Mother’s Optimization Problem
The mother’s optimization problem is solved recursively from the final period T . The
rationale is as follows: In order to make a choice at T−1, a mother calculates the expected
value of her choice at period T , given that her choice at T−1 is j. That is, at the beginning
of period T − 1, the mother chooses djT−1 by calculating
V (ST−1, T−1) = max
j
{U jT−1 + djT−1jT−1 + βEV (ST , T |St−1, djt−1)}.
In order to do this, first the mother must calculate
EV (ST , T ) = max
djT
E(V
1
T , V
2
T , V
3
T , V
4
T , V
5
T , V
6
T | ST−1, dT−1)
=
∑
k
Pr(ST , dkT = 1)U
k
T .
Now, returning to period T − 2, before she can decide dT−2 she needs to know the
alternative-specific value functions for every feasible SjT−2, and so forth, until she arrives
at the current period t.
A.2 Discussion of Sampling Variation Between Our Study and Bernal
and Keane (2010 and 2011)
Bernal (2008) finds that mothers’ employment decisions are detrimental to children’s out-
comes, which is completely opposite to our results. She uses a sample of children born
to two-parents families. Thus in these two situations (two-parent v. one-parent families),
rearing technologies are different. However, it is puzzling to us that, using a similar sam-
ple of children, Bernal and Keane (2010 and 2011) (referred to as B&K hereafter) find
negative employment effects while we find positive ones. We investigate the reasons for
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this disagreement in results by concentrating on the three dimensions where our paper
differs from theirs.
The first main difference is the focus of analysis. In this paper, we look at the effects of
welfare use and employment on children’s cognitive outcomes, while B&K investigate the
effects of child care. Since the common data source, Children of NLSY 79 mothers, only
provides annual child care information for the first three years, B&K use employment as
an empirical proxy for child care. Using employment as a proxy for child care in our
context can be problematic, as formal child care provision for less-educated mothers (one
of the dimensions where our samples differ, as discussed below) is highly correlated with
participation in the welfare program (for example, through the JOBS program). In our
sample, regardless of work status, mothers on welfare are more likely to use formal care,
if they ever use care at all (25 percent for mothers on welfare as opposed to 20 percent
for those who are not on welfare). Also, 17 percent of B&K’s sample are who use formal
child care but do not work (see B&K, 2011: Figure 1, or Section 5.3). In our less-educated
mothers sample, 26 percent of children-quarters are of mothers who did not work but had
used both welfare and formal care.
It is highly likely that part of the benefit of formal child care (see B&K, 2011: Section
6.8) for welfare mothers is obtained through welfare program-related child care provision.
As a result, it may be improper to discuss the effects of child care on low-skilled groups
without simultaneously taking welfare use into account. In this sense, our research com-
plements B&K’s in that we control for a separate channel through which child care affects
children’s outcomes. Furthermore, as late as 1992, welfare use guaranteed eligibility for
Medicaid, Food Stamps, Head Start, and job training programs. As a result, welfare use
provides a much broader package of support for mothers in raising their children. This,
we think, explains why our welfare use coefficient shows a positive effect for most of our
sample children.
In addition to the different focus of research, our paper also has a different sample of
children. The choice of outcome variable is the first reason for this discrepancy. In this
paper we focus only on one outcome (PIAT-Math), while their dependent variable com-
prises three outcomes: PIAT-Read, PIAT-Math and PPVT. In other words, a child may
be included in a sample as many as three times in B&K or Bernal (2008). This practice
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significantly increases the sample size of B&K from 1,464 observations to 3,787 obser-
vations. We use PIAT-math test scores as our primary measure of attainment primarily
because they have been shown to be predictors of not only later math scores but also over-
all academic achievement in general (see Claessens, Duncan and Engel, 2009; Duncan et
al., 2004). Moreover we can show that our result are robust when we use non-Math test
scores as our outcome measures.
The second reason for different sample sizes is the sampling restrictions we impose, in
terms of the marital and education status of the mothers. We focus only on single mothers
who are less educated (defined empirically as having received no more than 12 years
of schooling), while the B&K sample includes all single mothers. We use a sample of
less-educated mothers because we believe better-educated mothers are not relevant to our
study, since our concern is the effect of welfare use. It is well known that mothers who are
relatively better educated are much less likely to use welfare. In our sample, 79 percent
single mothers with, at most, high school education, used welfare at some point, while the
ratio for single mothers with at least some college education is only 40 percent. If they
have ever used welfare, the latter group is also on welfare for much shorter period of time
(8 quarters as opposed to 13 quarters for the former group). Moreover, better educated
mothers tend to work much more: 90 percent of women with more than 12 years of
schooling have worked, and conditional on working, on average, they have worked for 14
quarters. In our sample, only 74 percent of mothers have reported positive hours of work
for an average of 10 quarters. (Note that in Table 1, work is defined as having reported
more than 500 hours of work per year.)
In sum, usage of multiple test scores as a unit of observation increases their sam-
ple significantly; while the sampling variations imply that they include better educated
mothers. Both strategies have advantages and disadvantages. Given that both the B&K
papers and our study find that a marginal employment effect is decreasing as children’s
innate ability increases, one possible explanation for the difference in results is that moth-
ers with better education (and higher AFQT scores, which itself is highly correlated with
the mothers’ own education levels) that are captured by B&K’s sample have their time
effects outweigh the role model effects. Specification 4.5 in Table A-9 of Chyi and Oz-
turk (2012) confirms this conjecture. It expands the sample by including better-educated
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single mothers to estimate the marginal effects of the baseline model.A-1 As can be seen,
the effects of mothers’ work decisions become negative for children with higher observed
innate abilities, which actually corresponds to B&K.
The third difference is that they include many more regressors than we do. In partic-
ular, they have the following regressors that we do not: (1) mothers’ work experiences
prior to their children’s birth, including whether they have ever worked and any quarters
of work prior to their children’s birth; (2) mothers who may not have AFQT scores (with
a dummy indicator for mothers with missing AFQTs); and (3) many of the regressors are
allowed to interact with the work/child care variables. Please see Table A-1 for a complete
list.
To understand how and if differences in samples and models result in the differences
between our findings, we attempt to first replicate the B&K models using our sample and
then estimate our models using their sampling methods. Some of the techniques used by
B&K to fill in missing data are not transparent, hence we were unable to replicate their
entire sample and were about 700 observations short. So we thus asked Raquel Bernal
to provide us with her data and she kindly sent us the identifiers for the children in her
sample so that we can compare the models and effects of sampling strategies using their
data. Table A-1 reports the estimates of the following reduced-form outcome equation
with various samples and regressors
Ot = A0 + γeEt + A0Etγae + (Yt, V2)β + ν.
We see that (Yt,V2)′β is given as
(Yt, V2)
′β = β1m+ β2t+ β3Nsibling + β4always single
+ β5oldest+ β6gender + β7Black + β8Hispanic.
Here,Nsibling is the number of siblings a child has at time t, oldest indicates whether the
child is the oldest child in the family, m is the income per household member (capturing
A-1However, the sample in that study includes mothers who were sometimes married during the sampling
window.
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the financial resources available for a child),A-2 and gender, Black and Hispanic are
indicators for gender and racial characteristics (where gender=1 if female, Black=1 if
Black, Hispanic=1 if Hispanic). The data used in our paper are for any mothers who was
single at any time in the first five years after the child’s birth. We include an indicator that
takes the value of 1 if a mother has always been single during this period (always single).
In this setup, ν is the unobserved shock, and δ, γ and β are the vectors of coefficients to
be estimated.
Table A-2, which will be the main focus of the discussion below, collects the marginal
effects estimates from these models given children’s different observed innate ability lev-
els (A0).
Specification 1 uses the same work and child care definition as B&K. It also has the
same regressors as those in B&K and uses the same sample that is used by B&K. As can
been seen in the marginal effects in Table A-2, we can successfully recreate the negative
employment effects acquired by them. Therefore, the differences between our results
have to lie in the above mentioned differences in our sampling strategy.
Specification 2 is identical to Specification 1, except that we use our definition of
work. That is, we exclude those who had used child care but never reported positive
hours of work. As can be seen from Table A-2, both mean and median marginal effects of
employment are now positive. There is undoubtedly significant empirical consequence to
including this type of child care as employment. In fact, it can be reasonably argued that
this group of mothers (who did not work while having used child care) may have physical
or mental conditions (for example, drug use or disability) that prevent them from working
or taking care of their own children.
Specification 3 uses the same work and child care definition and regressors as B&K,
but uses our sample (hence including mothers who have better education). As can be
seen from Table A-2, although no longer significant, the mean and median effects are still
negative. We take this as an indication that our different sampling strategy is not the main
reason for the different signs in the employment effects of the two studies.
Finally, Specification 4 tries to gauge the importance of the inclusion of different
regressors. After running models with exhaustive combinations of various regressors,
A-2It can be expressed as m =
∑T
k=1
(Mk+WkI
w
k +Ekwk)
household size .
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we find that the absence of prior work experiences in our independent variables actually
accounts for a significant part of the positive employment effect. Specification 4 in Table
A-2 lists the estimation results using B&K’s sample and definition of work. However, we
do not include a prior work experience dummy nor quarters worked prior to the child’s
birth. It can be seen that both the median and the mean effects are significantly positive
now.
Comparisons of Specifications 1 to 4 show that the most important sources of variation
between B&K and our results come from (1) B&K’s inclusion in employment figures
of people who used child care but have never worked, and (2) inclusion of prior work
experience as a regressor.
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Table A-1: Comparing B&K and Our Results
Specification 1 2 3 4
B&K’s Work, Our Work, B&K’s Work and No Prior Work,
Regressors and B&K’s Regressors and Regressors, B&K’s Work and
Sample Sample Our Sample Sample
Mother’s Decision
E -0.176*** -0.095*** 0.016 0.360***
(γe) (0.029) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023)
Observed Covariates
Income 0.004** 0.003 0.030*** -0.007
Per Child† (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010)
Age Taking Test -0.048*** -0.043*** -0.003 -0.035***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.013)
Number of -1.396*** -1.157*** -1.648*** -0.749***
Siblings (0.062) (0.055) (0.044) (0.248)
Oldest 1.919*** 2.042*** 1.770*** 1.914***
Child (0.142) (0.142) (0.102) (0.604)
Our A0
Birth 0.953*** 1.551*** 2.620*** 3.049***
Weight (0.234) (0.231) (0.174) (0.985)
AFQT 2.806*** 3.318*** 2.249*** 1.821***
(0.099) (0.089) (0.078) (0.441)
High School 3.351*** 3.494*** 2.564*** 2.058***
Dummy (0.174) (0.180) (0.128) (0.776)
Also in B&K’s A0
Gender 3.286*** 3.212*** 1.401*** 2.748***
(0.123) (0.123) (0.096) (0.519)
Black -5.326*** -7.393*** -5.158*** -6.715***
(0.190) (0.189) (0.147) (0.955)
Hispanic -5.880*** -7.960*** -6.105*** -8.638***
(0.283) (0.275) (0.189) (1.185)
Mother’s -3.925*** -3.098*** -1.436*** -2.350**
Age (0.276) (0.275) (0.212) (1.150)
Age 0.071*** 0.056*** 0.026*** 0.045**
Squared (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.019)
Born Before -0.041 -1.279*** 2.026*** 0.600
18 (0.300) (0.305) (0.222) (1.223)
Born After -5.988*** -3.142*** 1.591*** -5.717**
33 (0.545) (0.549) (0.406) (2.413)
Worked 0.415*** 0.463*** 0.022
Before (0.031) (0.031) (0.023)
Prior Work 0.822*** -0.273 1.902***
Experience (0.187) (0.171) (0.141)
PIAT-Read 6.846*** 6.845*** 5.061*** 6.985***
(0.127) (0.126) (0.091) (0.539)
PPVT -15.870*** -16.162*** -13.352*** -17.648***
(0.135) (0.141) (0.103) (0.580)
φe 5.747*** 2.064*** 1.871*** -6.456***
(0.570) (0.236) (0.404) (1.876)
Constant 137.151*** 125.793*** 97.594*** 111.574***
(4.199) (4.213) (3.238) (17.647)
· All specifications include the state fixed effect, interactions between A0 and E, and dummies for
missing AFQT and birth weight. To save space, they are not listed.
*** : significant at 1% significance level. ∗∗: significant at 5% significance level. ∗: significant at 10%
significance level.
† Measured in thousands real dollars (year 2000 price deflated by PCED nondurable).
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Table A-2: Marginal Effects Calculated (Based on Table A-1)
Specification 1 2 3 4
B&K’s Work, Our Work and B&K’s Work and No Prior Work,
Regressors and B&K’s Regressors and Regressors, B&K’s Work and
Sample Sample Our Sample Sample
Marginal Effects of Employment = γe +
∑
i γaeiV1i
1% 0.283*** 0.641*** 0.474*** 0.845***
(0.059) (0.041) (0.041) (0.056)
25% -0.015 0.269*** 0.097*** 0.508***
(0.039) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035)
50% -0.127*** 0.078*** -0.025 0.388***
(0.038) (0.028) (0.028) (0.034)
75% -0.284*** -0.115*** -0.120*** 0.240***
(0.037) (0.026) (0.027) (0.034)
99% -0.774*** -0.664*** -0.456*** -0.177***
(0.045) (0.023) (0.039) (0.038)
Mean -0.164*** 0.067* -0.010 0.367***
(0.039) (0.028) (0.028) (0.033)
· All specifications also include state and cohort fixed effects.
*** : significant at 1% significance level. ∗∗: significant at 5% significance level. ∗: significant at
10% significance level.
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